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This paper analyses how financial and labor market imperfections jointly influence investment. 
The contemporaneous presence of imperfections in both markets gives rise to a negative correlation 
between EPL and investment: firms facing negative shocks see their financial constraints worsen in 
countries with greater labor market rigidities. Internal funds have an overall positive impact on in-
vestment, notwithstanding the presence of labor market rigidities acts as a disincentive to the use 
internal funds for financing new projects. If capital is sunk and the legal environment favors ex-post 
profit appropriation by workers, firms use internal funds for ends alternative to fixed investment. 
Our results support the effort put forward by European institutions to reform both markets. 
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This paper aims at analysing how financial and labor market imperfections jointly influence in-
vestment decisions. To our knowledge economic literature on this specific aspect is scarce. Excep-
tions are Wasmer and Weil (2004), Rendon (2004), Belke and Fehn (2000), and a previous paper of 
Calcagnini and Saltari (2003). Indeed, notwithstanding the ongoing massive production of papers 
concerning the relationship between investment and firm access to financial resources, on one hand,  
and the more recent increasing number of papers analyzing the consequences of labor market insti-
tutions and regulation of employment and investment (in training and fixed capital), on the other, 
the effects of labor and financial market imperfections on investment have not yet been fully ex-
plored in the economic literature. 
The analysis of how investment reacts to different conditions prevailing in financial and labor 
markets makes the traditional set-up of firms’ capital adjustment richer and closer to real-world 
situations. Moreover, it sheds light on the implications for economic growth due to policy moves 
towards more liberalised financial and labor markets recently carried out in Europe. 
As for the first of the two aforementioned strands of the economic literature, nowadays it is 
widely accepted that investment decisions are affected by firms’ liquidity conditions in the presence 
of imperfect capital markets. Some scholars argued about the correct size of the coefficient of this 
relationship (i.e., the sensitiveness of investment to internal funds) (Fazzari et al., 2000 and 1988; 
Kaplan and Zingales, 1997 and 2000), but recent contributions to the debate seem to have recon-
ciled the two opposite views by developing a model in which the cost of borrowing is determined 
endogenously and a firm’s internal funds are allowed to be negative. This model produces a non-
monotonic relationship between the firm’s internal funds and its investment: investment is increas-
ing in internal funds when firms have positive internal funds; in contrast, if the level of internal   3
funds is sufficiently negative, investment is decreasing in the level of internal funds (Cleary et al., 
2004).  
As for the other strand of the literature, sometimes dubbed the Employment Protection Legisla-
tion (EPL) theory, the disagreement among economists is even greater, thus making it difficult to 
draw general conclusions. In fact, differences in national EPLs - empirically - have an ambiguous 
effect on unemployment, employment, or productivity (Young, 2003; OECD, 1999; Aidt and Tzan-
natos, 2002); the clearest result is that EPL mainly has real effects on labor market dynamics, that 
is, on inflows and outflows from unemployment (Bentolila and Bertola, 1990).
1 EPL may positively 
affect incentives to invest in training, as long as the employment relationship is stable. However, 
this result is again dubious, given that EPL does not prevent employees from leaving the firm, re-
gardless of whether employers have invested in training them (Young, 2003). But recent empirical 
contributions have found that EPL does matter for employers in deciding to invest in new technolo-
gies, develop new products, diversify and take risks (Gaëlle and Scarpetta, 2004; Eustace, 2000). 
Specifically, strict EPL reduces incentives to invest by increasing the costs of adjusting the work-
force along the business cycle and in the event of innovations. This result is consistent with the 
more traditional result of trade union impact on aspects of economic performance, according to 
which price-cost ratios, Tobin’s q, and subjective profitability assessments - and therefore invest-
ment - tend to be lower in unionized firms than in similar non-unionized firms (Aidt and Tzannatos, 
2002). 
A point worth noting is that the size effect of EPL on investment might depend upon firms’ li-
quidity conditions in the presence of inefficient capital markets. Indeed, when a negative shock oc-
curs, firms may face the following trade-off:  keep losing money on unproductive workers, or fire 
them and pay the dismissal costs (Rendon, 2004; Saint-Paul, 2002). The choice made by firms will 
depend upon the nature of the shock. Temporary shocks will likely determine fewer layoffs, as op-
posed to the case of permanent shocks. Indifferently from the type of shocks, firms will need to   4
generate either additional internal funds or cut (or delay) their investment plans. In other words, 
firms with better liquidity conditions are in a position to determine their optimal investment policy, 
even in the presence of stringent employment protection regulations, than those facing financial 
constraints.
2 
This paper innovates our previous work in two main areas: the use of firm level data for seven 
European countries, and the use of explicit measures of EPL as an explanatory variable of our 
model. 
Our results show that both financial and labor market imperfections influence investment as ex-
pected. Moreover, whenever these imperfections are jointly present, investment becomes more sen-
sitive to conditions prevailing in both markets.
3  
As for financial market imperfections alone, we find that investment is positively affected by 
firms’ ability to generate internal funds and, therefore, to overcome the increasing costs of access-
ing external financial resources, or the presence of finance rationing. 
As for the effect of EPL alone on investment, the economic literature provides examples accord-
ing which it might be negative or positive. On the one hand, as pointed out by Alesina et al. (2005), 
regulation increases the cost the firm faces in expanding its productive capacity, and limits its ca-
pacity to respond to changes in fundamentals. Therefore, a higher EPL should result in a negative 
impact on extension investment, by increasing firm adjustment costs over time. Figure 1 and Figure 
3 show the negative relationship between EPL and the share of extension investment over the pe-
riod 1991-2003 for the countries in our sample.
4 On the other hand, higher Employment Protection 
Legislation values also mean higher firing costs and, therefore, higher labor costs. The latter imply 
a substitution effect of labor with capital, with the consequence of likely higher capital accumula-
tion growth rates. The substitution effect means that firms find it convenient to move towards more 
capital-intensive technologies wherever labor market institutions make the organization of produc-
tion less responsive to the business cycle. This alternative interpretation draws support from the   5
positive relationship that exists between the EPL levels and the share of investments devoted to ra-
tionalisation, as shown in Figure 2 and in Figure 4, as well as by the slower increase in the capital 
stock per worker available in Europe, compared to the U.S. economy (see Figure 5). The latter phe-
nomenon started around the mid-nineties, following an easing of the EPL levels in most European 
countries (see also European Commission, 2001, Graph 9, p. 111; OECD, 2004).  
Which of the two effects of EPL on investment prevails is mostly an empirical matter and the is-
sue is addressed in Section 3. Our empirical analysis shows that the negative effect is larger than the 
substitution effect, i.e. overall firms investments are negatively affected by higher degree of em-
ployment protection. 
When we consider firms operating in economies characterized by the simultaneous presence of 
financial and labor market imperfections, we find that the coefficient of the interaction variable is 
negative: firms facing negative shocks see their financial constraints worsen in countries with more 
rigid labor market. In other words, the presence of labor market rigidities represents a disincentive 
to the use of internal funds for financing new investments. If capital is largely sunk after being in-
vested, and the legal environment favors ex-post profit appropriation by workers (as claimed by 
hold-up theories), firms may find it convenient to use internal funds for any ends alternative to fixed 
investment: i.e., paying back their debts, acquiring financial assets, etc.. However, the overall effect 
of internal funds is positive, confirming the traditional role that this type of variable plays in in-
vestment decision models with capital market imperfections. 
On the policy side our results provide a clear-cut message concerning the type of interventions 
national governments and European institutions should design to improve economic growth per-
spectives. Indeed, investment is at the core of any economic growth process. In the short-run it is an 
important component of aggregate demand; in the long-run, it determines an expansion of produc-
tive capacities, and allows the embodiment of technological innovations in existing production 
processes.  The result is therefore the improvement of an economy’s international competitiveness.   6
The latter, in turn, also means more job opportunities. However, labor market reforms alone are not 
sufficient to stimulate investment; they should be necessarily accompanied by reforms in other mar-
kets. In this paper we show that policy decisions aimed at improving capital market efficiency and 
reducing labor market rigidities are expected to act as an incentive to fixed investment.
5 Indeed, 
much effort has been made by European institutions to stimulate reforms in both markets in recent 
years. Therefore, we might expect more favorable conditions for economic growth in Europe in the 
not-too-distant future. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 addresses the empirical aspects of the pa-
per (data sources, variables definitions and our model specification) and discusses the econometric 
results. Section 3 summarizes the main findings of the paper and its policy implications. 
 
2. Data Sources 
The data used in this paper come from several sources. Annual firm-level observations over the 
period 1995-2003 are taken from AMADEUS, a comprehensive, pan-European database containing 
financial information on seven million public and private companies in 38 European countries. The 
data set covers all sectors, with the exception of the financial sector. It is produced by Bureau van 
Dijk (BvD), whose local providers collect balance sheet information, sectors of operation, and 
number of employees from the national Chambers of Commerce. There are several versions of 
AMADEUS, depending on the number of firms included in the dataset. In this paper we use the  “7 
million” database, but we base our analysis on a random sample extracted from the original data-
base of seven of the largest European Countries: Belgium, France, Germany, United Kingdom, It-
aly, the Netherlands, and Spain. 
To transform nominal into real variables we used price deflators obtained from the Annual 
macro-economic (AMECO) database provided by the European Commission's Directorate General 
for Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN).
6   7
Information on EPL is the well-known time series of the OECD EPL Index. Time series of the 
EPL index are available for total, regular and temporary workers, respectively. Since most of the 
literature on employment protection emphasizes the analogy of EPL to an employer-borne tax on 
employment adjustment, the overall intent is to reflect the cost implications of various regulatory 
provisions for employers (i.e. stricter is interpreted as more costly). The overall summary measure 
of EPL strictness relies on three main components related to protection of regular workers against 
(individual) dismissal, specific requirements for collective dismissals and regulation of temporary 
forms of employment. Protection of regular contracts against (individual) dismissal constitutes the 
core component of the overall summary index of EPL strictness. Indeed, although temporary forms 
of employment have grown in many OECD countries over the past two decades, regular contracts 
are still the most common employment arrangement Temporary work is sometimes regarded as a 
way to circumvent rules governing regular contracts. For the component related to collective dis-
missals, the story is quite different: by construction, it includes only regulation applicable in addi-
tion to that applied in cases of individual dismissals and cannot therefore be considered as a stand-
alone component of EPL. However, some potentially important aspects of employment protection 
are difficult to take into account in the EPL indicator such as trial or probationary periods and no-
tice periods and/or severance pay. In this paper we used the EPL index for total workers, Version 1, 
that excludes regulations on collective dismissals.
7 
Data have been filtered in many ways. First of all, to avoid double counting, we only considered 
unconsolidated accounts. Second, we controlled for outliers with respect to the median on original 
variables: Fixed assets (FIAS), Depreciation (DEPR), Cash Flow (CF), Sales (OPRE), Cash and 
Cash Equivalent (CASH).
8  
Finally, we restricted our data set to firms and variables for which we had at least observations 
for five years. This step allowed us to work with a less unbalanced panel and to have enough time 
series observations for each variable to robustly estimate our dynamic panel data models.   8
Eventually, we constructed the variables for our regressions as follows: 
-  (I/K)t = It / Kt-1 = (FIASt – FIASt-1 + DEPRt)/FIASt-1 is the investment ratio, i.e. the current 
gross investment divided by the beginning-of-period capital stock; 
-   (ΔSALES/K)t  =  ΔSALESt / Kt-1 = (OPREt – OPREt-1 ) / FIASt-1 is the accelerator variable, 
i.e. the sales change divided by the beginning-of-period capital stock; 
-  (CF/K)t = CFt / Kt-1 = (CFt)/ FIASt-1 current cash flow divided by the beginning-of-period 
capital stock; 
-   (LIQ/K)t = LIQt / Kt-1 = (CFt + CASHt-1 )/ FIASt-1 is the liquidity variable, i.e. the sum of the 
current cash flow and the beginning-of-period cash in hand divided by the beginning-of-
period capital stock. 
Table 1 shows some descriptive statistics of our panel-data sample. Belgian firms show the high-
est (median) investment ratio, while the Spanish and Dutch firms have the lowest. French firms 
show the highest investment ratio variability. French firms also show the largest (median) increase 
in sales (with respect to their capital stock), with Italian and U.K. firms coming in last. As for the 
liquidity variables, French firms show the largest (median) proportion of cash flow and cash in hand 
with respect to their capital stock. Diversely, U.K. and Italian firms have the lowest. Finally, the 
Spanish labor market shows the highest EPL strictness as opposed to the U.K. labor market, that 
appears to be the most flexible one among the countries herein. France is the only country where 
EPL did not change during the period 1995-2003. 
3. Model Specification 
 As for the choice of model specification, we were unable to make use of the Tobin’s q model, 
given that most of the companies in our sample are not listed. Therefore, we opted for a more eclec-
tic approach based on the traditional investment accelerator model integrated with variables 
capturing how firms’ fixed capital decisions react to labor market differences, and how the latter in-  9
teracts with the contemporaneous presence of capital market imperfections. In spite of its simplic-
ity, the investment accelerator model performs relatively well in empirical studies. A number of re-
cent evaluations ascribe to accelerator equations a better predictive power than any competing 
model in such diverse situations as industrialized economies, developing economies and transition 
economies (Lensink  and  Sterken, 2000; Bigsten et al., 1999; Mairesse et al., 1999; Abel  and 
Blanchard, 1989). 
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where the subscript i refers to the company, t to time period, and j to the country.   
Model (1) includes an autoregressive term, 
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⎛  that selects those firms that 
simultaneously face the most (least) strict financial constraints and are located in countries with the 
most flexible (rigid) labor markets. By means of this multiplicative interaction term we test the con-
ditional hypothesis that the effect of EPL (liquidity) on investment also depends on the degree of 
financial (labor) market imperfection.
9 
Finally, model (1) includes a set of dummy variables. We assumed that the variation in the user cost 
of capital among firms can be controlled for by using additive year- specific effects,   10
( 2003 ,..., 1995 , = t dt ), and firm-specific effects, ( N i i ,..., 1 , = η ), (Bond and Meghir, 1994). 
Firm-specific effects are also justified by the variation of depreciation rates across firms, whereas 
time dummies also control for the business cycle.   
We also added country dummies, ( 7 ,..., 1 , = j j φ ), to the empirical equation. Indeed, given the 
country specific nature of the Employment Protection Legislation, the EPL variable might capture 
other aspects, such as the differences in the heterogeneous environments in which firms operate, 
and not the differences in the tightness of employment protection. 
Finally,  t j i v , ,  is an error term satisfying the usual properties. 
Based on reasoning and results from a previous paper of Calcagnini and Saltari (2003) and a 
well-known strand of the economic literature, according to which cash flow might capture future 
investment opportunities not fully measured by the profitability variable (Gomes, 2001; Erickson 
and Whited, 2000; Saltari and Travaglini, 2003), or indicate other sources of misspecification in the 
investment model (Bond and Van Reenen, 2003), our liquidity variable is either cash flow or the 
sum of cash flow at time t plus cash holdings at the end of time t-1 (both divided by the level of 
fixed assets at time t-1). The latter, beside an at-hand source of liquidity, adds information to cash 
flow as a measure of financial market imperfections, because it is not directly influenced by multi-
ple sources of shocks that might affect the time-t generation of internal funds.
10 Indeed, cash hold-
ings are closely related to cash flow, given that they might be thought of as some function of cumu-
lated cash flow over time. Why should a firm’s investment project be delayed by insufficient cash 
flow if it might be funded by using its liquid assets or by offering them as collateral in the loan 
market? Moreover, financiers might see firms with a sounder liquidity position as less risky and 
charge them a lower interest rate. Indeed, the liquidity variable calculated as the sum of cash flow 
and cash holdings is strongly and positively ( 72 . 0 = r ) associated with an index of financing obsta-
cles obtained from the World Business Environment Survey (WBES) and published in Beck et al.   11
(2002), Table I, p.39.





















To estimate model (1), given its dynamic structure, we use the system GMM estimator approach 
(Blundell and Bond, 1998). This method controls for the presence of the unobserved firm-specific 
effect and for the endogeneity of contemporaneous regressors.
12 It uses equations in first-
differences for which endogenous variables lagged two or more periods will be valid instruments 
provided there is no serial correlation in the time varying component of the error term. This as-
sumption is tested by performing tests for serial correlation in the first differences residuals. The 
equations in differences are combined with the equations in levels, for which lagged differences of 
the variables are used as instruments. Instruments validity is tested by using a Hansen J test for 
overidentified restrictions that, differently from the Sargan test, is robust to autocorrelation or het-




Dynamic Panel-data estimates of model (1) over the period 1995-2003 are shown in Table 2.
14 
Columns (1) and (2) show robust estimated coefficients obtained from the unbalanced panel data 
when firm liquidity is measured by cash flow and cash flow plus cash holdings, respectively.
15  
As expected, results in column 1 show positive and statistically significant coefficients for the 
(first) autoregressive term, the accelerator and liquidity variables. 
The estimated coefficient of the EPL variable is negative and statistically significant: even 
though firms have an incentive to substitute labor with capital in the presence of strict employment 
protection legislations, this incentive appears to be more than counterbalanced by the negative ef-
fect of rigid labor market on firm’s ability to respond to changes in fundamentals.    12
Finally, the estimated coefficient measuring how the potential contemporaneous presence of im-
perfect capital and labor markets impact on investment is negative and statistically significant. It 
signals that investment is lower where both markets show high degrees of imperfection. Therefore, 
in a Modigliani-Miller world, where investment is independent from internal sources of funds, 
firms would have no incentive to hold cash and the coefficient of this interaction variable would be 
zero. To fully understand what this coefficient means, it is convenient to evaluate the total effect on 
investment of the liquidity and employment protection legislation variables.  
We first note that the difference between the estimated coefficient of the cash flow by itself and 
that disentangled from the coefficient of the interaction term is positive (0.113) and statistically 
different from 0 at the 1% probability level.
16 This result is shown in Table 2 in the row labelled 
“Total Cash-Flow Effect”. In other words, the overall effect of cash flow on investment is posi-
tive.
17 However, its positive contribution is dampened wherever the labor market’s imperfections 
are severe: i.e., firms worried to find themselves in a hold-up situation due to the legislative con-
straints that make labor utilization more difficult to adjust to cyclical conditions. They do not ex-
pand their fixed capital, but more likely use internal funds to expand financial assets or reduce their 
debt burden. Moreover, when EPL is large, the availability of internal funds could matter less for 
investment because part of the funds must be used to pay firing costs to get rid of redundant work-
ers. 
Even though the coefficients of EPL and (EPL*CF/K) are both negative, meaning that the im-
pact of employment protection legislation on investment is clearly signed, the row in Table 2 la-
belled “Total EPL Effect” shows the overall impact of EPL on investment (-0.033). The latter is sta-
tistically different from 0 at the 1% probability level. 
 The negative relationship that we find between EPL and investment is often found in reports 
stressing the influence of institutions on economic variables.
18 Usually, this conclusion is drawn by 
simple correlation or graphical analysis. Our results confirm this conclusion, but in a more robust   13
way. Moreover, we show that the negative impact of employment protection legislation on invest-
ment is the result of two opposite effects, where the negative one dominates the positive one, and 
the contemporaneous presence of capital market imperfections appears to reinforce this negative ef-
fect. 
Column (2) in Table 2 shows the estimated coefficients of model (1) when the Cash-Flow vari-
able is replaced by the Liquidity variable, calculated as the sum of cash flow and cash holdings. Re-
sults of column (2) are equivalent to those shown in column (1), but the overall impact of EPL on 
investment is larger than in the previous case, while the impact of cash flow and cash holdings on 
investment is smaller than in the case when only cash flow is used. 
Finally, Table 3 shows estimation results of two alternative specifications of model (1), but lim-
ited to the case with the Cash-Flow variable. In the first specification we assumed that both the EPL 
and the cash flow affect investment with a lag of one year. In the second one, we assumed that only 
EPL enters model (1) lagged. Overall, results are less satisfactory than those in Table 2. The coeffi-
cient of lagged EPL is statistically significant only when cash flow is also lagged one period, but 
the coefficient of the latter is not statistically significant as the coefficient of the interaction term. In 
the case when only EPL is lagged one period, the sole statistically significant coefficient is the in-
teraction term one. Thus empirical results are favourable to the specification the estimates of which 
are shown in Table 2 and on which we will base our conclusions. 
 
5. Conclusion 
There is a growing concern among policy makers and economists about the loss of competitive-
ness shown in recent years by the European economy versus the U.S. economy. Among several ex-
planations, we think that one important direction requiring investigation is the faster pace of capital 
accumulation observed in the U.S. economy compared to the European one. This difference in the 
capital accumulation process has allowed the U.S. economy to exploit the advantages of new tech-  14
nologies in all sectors of the economy; moreover, it supported the creation of new jobs without pe-
nalizing U.S. labor productivity. Diversely, the expansion of employment in Europe favoured by 
less strict employment protection legislation was not accompanied by a proportional growth in 
fixed capital, resulting instead in a relative decrease in labor productivity. Indeed, recent contribu-
tions show that the productivity slowdown in the euro area in the second part of the nineties may be 
linked to a slower capital accumulation process and greater hiring of workers (especially in tradi-
tional industries) following the structural wage-setting changes that occurred in Europe during the 
second half of the 1990s (Estevão, 2004; Travaglini and Saltari, 2006). 
Our results show that the design of economic policies aimed at filling the gap between the two 
economies should be directed to contemporaneously eliminating or easing imperfections in both 
markets. European institutions are becoming more and more aware of the necessity to pursue this 
strategy, that also includes the search for more competition in the product market.
19 Therefore, we 
are more optimistic about the prospects of the European economy, as long as policy interventions 
continue along the lines that have already been undertaken.   15
Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics: 1995-2003 
Country I/K  ΔSALES/K CF/K  LIQ/K  EPL 
BELGIUM    
Nr.  of  firms 315 315 315 315 --
Nr.  of  Obs 2029 2029 2029 2014  --
Mean 0.25 0.30 0.49 0.98  2.40
Median 0.20 0.18 0.38 0.60  2.20
Standard  Dev. 0.21 2.61 0.48 1.19  0.40
       
FRANCE    
Nr.  of  firms 4512 4512 4512 4512  --
Nr.  of  Obs 25345 25345 25345 24717  --
Mean 0.24 0.39 0.61 1.52  3.00
Median 0.18 0.21 0.46 0.97  3.00
Standard  Dev. 0.23 2.78 0.66 1.60  0.00
       
GERMANY    
Nr. of firms  52  52 52 52  --
Nr.  of  Obs 248 254 254 247 --
Mean 0.22 0.19 0.40 0.65  2.60
Median 0.18 0.08 0.29 0.44  2.50
Standard  Dev. 0.18 1.98 0.37 0.60  0.26
       
ITALY    
Nr.  of  firms 3374 3374 3374 3374  --
Nr.  of  Obs 19636 19636 19636 19224  --
Mean 0.24  -0.02 0.28 0.63  2.62
Median 0.18 0.01 0.21 0.36  2.59
Standard  Dev. 0.21 2.20 0.36 0.88  0.53
       
NETHERLANDS    
Nr.  of  firms 34 34 34 34  --
Nr.  of  Obs 212 212 212 208 --
Mean 0.20 0.22 0.46 0.69  2.34
Median 0.15 0.06 0.37 0.50  2.10
Standard  Dev. 0.17 1.94 0.43 0.70  0.29
       
SPAIN    
Nr. of firms  4172  4172 4172 4172  --
Nr.  of  Obs 23172 23183 23183 22615  --
Mean 0.22 0.32 0.38 0.84  3.01
Median 0.15 0.16 0.29 0.50  3.10
Standard  Dev. 0.22 2.32 0.40 1.07  0.10
       
U. K.     
Nr.  of  firms 1219 1219 1219 1219  --
Nr.  of  Obs 6947 6947 6947 6748  --
Mean 0.20 0.06 0.31 0.62  0.64
Median 0.16 0.01 0.22 0.34  0.60
Standard  Dev. 0.21 2.19 0.39 0.91  0.04
Source: Calculations based on AMADEUS  and OECD data. 
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Table 2 
Arellano-Bond Dynamic Panel-data Estimation 
One-step System GMM Results 
a 
 
  (1)  (2) 
Dependent variable (I/K)t  (I/K)t 





















































Time dummies  Yes  Yes 
Country dummies  Yes  Yes 
Firm specific effect  Yes  Yes 
Hansen J Overid. Restrictions, p-value  0.562 0.420 
Arellano-Bond Test AR(1), p-value 0.000  0.001 
Arellano-Bond Test AR(2), p-value 0.166  0.162 
Total Cash-Flow Effect (∂I
∂CF )  0.133
***  
Total Liquidity Effect (∂I
∂LIQ)   0.080
*** 




No. of Observations  47650  46550 
No. of Firms  12835  12821 
Standard Errors are shown in parentheses; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 significance levels, respectively 
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Table 3 
Arellano-Bond Dynamic Panel-data Estimation 
One-step System GMM Results 
a 
 
  (1)  (2) 
Dependent variable (I/K)t  (I/K)t 
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Time dummies  Yes  Yes 
Country dummies  Yes  Yes 
Firm specific effect  Yes  Yes 
Hansen J Overid. Restrictions, p-value  0.405 0.721 
Arellano-Bond Test AR(1), p-value 0.000  0.000 
Arellano-Bond Test AR(2), p-value 0.093  0.181 
No. of Observations  47650  47650 
No. of Firms  12835  12835 
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Figure 1 - EPL vs Share of Extension Investment 1991-2003














Figure 2 - EPL vs Share of Rationalization Investment 1991-2003














Figure 3 - EPL vs Share of Extension Investment 1991-2003











Figure 4 - EPL vs Share of Rationalization Investment 1991-2003











Source :  EU Commission and OECD 
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Endnotes 
 
1 The economic literature on this topic is nowadays vast. For a more in depth discussion see Bertola et 
al. (1999), Betcherman et al. (2001), Blanchard (2004), Blanchard and Philippon (2004), Grubb and 
Wells (1993), Nickell et al. (2002), Nickell (2003). 
2 Pica (2001) shows that borrowing constrained firms have lower current employment.  In other words, 
labor demand positively depends on the stock of internal funds because they contribute to relax future 
financial constraints. 
3 Our results are consistent with those of Rendon (2004) referred to Spanish companies. 
4 Figure 1 and 2 show annual country-level observations over the period 1991-2003 for 7 countries: 
Belgium, France, Germany, U.K., Italy, The Netherlands and Spain. In Figure 3 and 4 France and the 
U.K. are left out of the sample: France is excluded because their EPL indexes do not change in the pe-
riod; U.K. because displays low levels of the EPL index compared to the average European levels.   
5 On this topic see also Love (2001). 
6 The AMECO database is available from the European Union web site: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/indicators/annual_macro_economic_database/ameco_en.htm. 
7 See OECD (2004), pp. 64-70. 
8 Variable labels in parentheses are the original AMADEUS labels. 
 
9 Multiplicative interaction models are common in the quantitative social and political science lit-
erature. Institutional arguments frequently imply that the relationship between economic inputs and 
outcomes varies depending on the institutional context. See Brambor et al. (2006). 
10 See also Beck et al. (2003) and Sterken et al. (2002). 
11 WBES is a cross-national survey conducted in developed and developing countries in 1999 led by 
the World Bank. We find that the correlation of cash flow alone with the WB  index  is lower ( r=0.37).    23
                                                                                                                                                                        
12 In all our estimates EPL is assumed to be exogenous. This assumption might be invalidated by the 
presence of reverse causation between I/K and EPL. However, we make use of data at firm level, while 
EPL information is at the national level. Therefore, we do not see how changes in the investment rate at  
firm level may affect EPL. This might happen due to business cycles reasons, but we control for the 
business cycle in our estimation. Further, we also estimated model specifications where EPL is en-
dogenized and, consequently, instrumented. Even in this case the estimated coefficients of all variables 
do not change significantly, except for the estimated coefficient of EPL itself that is still negative (and 
statistically significant), but higher in absolute value. These results are available upon request from the 
authors. 
13 Two-step system GMM results are equivalent to the one-step results and are available upon request 
from the authors. 
14 Estimated coefficients obtained by the Stata SE 10.0 command xtabond2. 
15 We also estimated model (1) excluding French firms from our sample because during the period 
1995-2003 EPL did not change in France. Results are qualitatively similar to those shown in Table (2) 
and, thus, we opted to not report them. However, they are available upon request from the authors. 
16 The total effect of cash flow on investment has been calculated as the coefficient of cash flow plus 
the coefficient of the interaction term times the average of EPL. Similarly, we calculated the total effect 
on investment of LIQ and EPL. 
17 Cleary, Povell and Raith (2004) theoretically show that cash flow might have a negative impact on 
investment for sufficiently negative levels of the cash flow. To control for the potential existence of 
non linearities between investment and cash flow, we also estimated the model over a smaller sample 
with only positive levels of CF. In this case we loose 2712 observations, but our estimated coefficients 
do not change with respect to those obtained with the whole sample. These results are available upon 
request from the authors. 
18 For instance, see European Economy (2001), Chapter 3. 
19 See IMF (2004). 